Given the results of studies using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), emotion-based sensitivity to an anticipated outcome of one's own behavior has been suggested to be a significant factor in making advantageous decisions. Hypotheses-testing in performing IGT is essential for learning correct rules and elicits autonomic reactivity. In this study, participants were asked to concentrate on hypothesis-testing to learn undisclosed rules in the task which framework was similar to the IGT, rather than maximizing monetary reward. The amplitudes of skin conductance responses (SCRs) prior to card selection and following feedback were attenuated as participants came to accurately comprehend the task rules. The attenuation of SCRs resulted from reduced motivation to continue the hypotheses-testing. Our findings provide some evidence that observed autonomic responses partially reflect emotional reactions associated with the hypothesis-testing.
(disadvantageous decks), while the remaining two decks yield low immediate gain, but lower future loss (advantageous decks). During the execution of the task, skin conductance responses (SCRs) of participants are recorded to indicate the emotional state (Boucsein, 1992) . Unlike normal healthy adults, patients with damaged OFC are more likely to select cards from the disadvantageous decks, and fail to generate larger anticipatory SCRs prior to picking cards from the disadvantageous decks (Bechara et al., 1996 , Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee 1999 Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara & Damasio, 2002) . These studies considered anticipatory SCRs as a measure of autonomic responses when someone is about to make risky decisions (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997) .
Although Bechara et al. (1994 Bechara et al. ( , 1996 Bechara et al. ( , 1999 suggested that emotion-based sensitivity to anticipated future events is an independent variable in the IGT framework, several previous studies have proposed alternative important factors affecting performance. For instance, some researchers have emphasized the importance of flexible stimulusreinforcement learning related to reversal learning in the IGT (Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard, & Blair, 2002; Fellows & Farah, 2005) . Reversal learning paradigm is a proper way to examine the ability to adapt associative learning when the reward and punishment value of two or more stimuli switch (Fellows & Farah, 2003) . Studies of single unit activity in monkey's OFC (Rolls, 1994) , and neuroimaging studies on reward processing (O'Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critcheley, & Dolan, 2003; Ramnani, Elliot, Athwal, & Passingham, 2004) have shown that the OFC is crucial for detecting reward-related prediction errors. These findings suggest that the OFC is specialized for rapidly learning about context-related reward associations and rapid modification of predictions in new context. These studies support the theory that reversal learning is composed of such processes, and lesions of the OFC result in perseverative behavior in daily life and experimental decision-making tasks like the IGT. In addition, the personality traits of participants, such as impulsiveness and habitual anxiety, are considered to be components critically affecting IGT performance (Deakin, Aitken, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2004; Franken & Muris, 2005) .
Since monetary reward and punishment are motivationally salient and valued by most people (Knutson, Westdrop, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000; Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003) , most studies examining the role of emotions in decisionmaking have employed tasks including monetary feedback that corresponds to participants' responses. In such studies, participants are implicitly required to acquire the appropriate method of maximizing gains. For instance, to earn large amounts of money during the IGT requires that participants to learn correct rules regarding the characteristics of each deck, at least implicitly. It is also reasonable that process of achieving a goal includes hypothesis-testing.
Hypothesis-testing implies generation of plausible hypotheses and their verification. The hypotheses concerning covert rules governing the value of monetary reward or punishment are generated from prior experience, and then tested in subsequent trials. A study using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task revealed that monitoring of one's own performance and its outcome is essential for adapting self behavior when the response-reinforcement contingency was changed (Crone, Somsen, Zanolie, & van der Molen, 2006) . O'Doherty, Dayan et al. (2003) reported that there is a correlation between the degree of prediction error related to reward and the OFC activity. These studies suggest the interpretation that spontaneous prediction together with monitoring of self behavior and its results affect evaluations of the outcome and the association learning process. It is likely that not only emotional responses, which proceed from tangible rewards or punishments, but also those from hypothesis-testing-like processes are essential for adaptive decision-making in the context of problem solving.
In the present study, we attempted to clarify the role of autonomic reactivity derived from active hypothesis-testing processes in decision-making. We used a problem solving task with a framework similar to the IGT, because it is complex enough to elicit some extents of autonomic reactivity. We prepared four decks of playing cards and facsimile money, and asked healthy participants to learn the hidden rules, governing whether reward or punishment by, focusing their attention on hypothesis-testing. In our task, rates of punishment occurrence were equivalent among the four card decks, so the task was easier than that in the original IGT. Therefore almost all of the participants were expected to finally determine the rules of the task. Using our task, we could examine the relationship between hypothesis-testing processes and autonomic responses, which involve minimal emotional responses to monetary reward and punishment. If acceptation or negation of the tested hypotheses produced emotional responses, this should be associated with SCRs as well as monetary rewards or punishments. Since the motivation to understand the hidden rules was high in the beginning of the task, we predicted the emotional responses to selecting behavior and receiving feedback to be prominent. Consequently, emotional responses would attenuate as the need to test hypotheses concerning the rules decreased in the later part of the task.
METHODS

Participants
Thirty undergraduate students participated in this study (14 males, 16 females, mean age was 21.8 years). All participants gave informed consent to participate in the experiment and to examine their autonomic responses.
Experimental procedure
A revised version of the IGT was used in this study. The participants sat across a table from the experimenter. Four decks of 40 cards each were placed on the table. Half of the cards in each deck were hearts and diamonds, and the other half were clubs and spades. At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter handed 300,000 yen in facsimile money to the participants. They were told that the task required a long series of card selections until the experimenter stops them. They were given a monetary reward or punishment each time they turned over a card. It was not revealed to the participants that they would always be rewarded if the card selected was either club or spade, and would always be punished if the card was a heart or diamond. In addition, five of every ten cards from the top of each deck were hearts or diamonds, and the other five cards were clubs or spades. The order of cards in each deck was preset pseudorandomly. Giving and collecting money were performed by the experimenter, ensuring that SCRs related to task execution were free of those caused by physical movements.
The hidden rules concerning the characteristics of decks were determined similar to those for the IGT, i.e., two of the four decks yielded profit (advantageous decks) while the other two yielded loss (disadvantageous decks). Table 1 shows predetermined variations of reward and punishment for every ten cards from the top of each deck. Picking 10 cards from deck 1 or 2 yielded loss, though the amounts of immediate reward and punishment were larger with deck 1 and smaller with deck 2. In contrast, both decks 3 and 4 yielded profit, though the immediate reward and punishment were larger with deck 3 and smaller with deck 4. This manipulation helps to determine whether the participants placed great significance on the magnitude of immediate monetary reward or punishment during the task (Tomb, Hauser, Deldin, & Caramazza, 2002) . The layout of the four decks was varied between participants to control for spatial preference.
The experimenter required the participants to make an effort to scrutinize the governing rules of the task, and not to concentrate on earning as much money as possible. In accordance with this aim, they were free to switch picking cards from any deck to another at any time. They were given the hint that the decks and colors of the suits (red or black) played a role in deciding reward or punishment.
The experimenter ensured a minimum of 5 sec. 1) prior to card selection by the participants, 2) after the card selection, and 3) after the monetary feedback in each trial. These periods were termed the anticipatory period, pre-feedback period, and post-feedback period, respectively (Fig. 1) . The total number of card Punishment total ¥230,000 ¥65,000 ¥40,000 ¥15,000
Grand total (Reward+Punishment) ¥-50,000 ¥-50,000 ¥50,000 ¥50,000
Fig. 1. Outline of a trial. There were a minimum of 5 sec. 1) prior to the card selection by the participants, 2) after the card selection, and 3) after the monetary feedback in each trial.
selections was 100 though participants were not informed beforehand of this number. One session consisted of ten trials. After each session the participants were requested to report their on-going hypotheses about the rules governing the task and each deck. The experimenter emphasized that they were to test these hypotheses during the next session, and asked them to report their evaluations of hypotheses when the next session would be completed.
DATA ANALYSIS
Behavioral data
The frequency of card selection from each deck was calculated to determine whether the participants were following instructions. When the participants attempt to earn as much money as possible, increase in selection frequencies of profitable decks 3 and 4 is observed. Therefore statistical insignificant selection frequencies of any four decks indicate that participants were following instructions.
Verbal report data of perceived rules
We classified the contents of the reported hypotheses about hidden rules into three levels according to the criteria below. We evaluated whether the participants understood what determines types and amounts of feedback. When they reported nothing or completely incorrect hypotheses, the hypotheses were classified into the rule unperceived level. We classified the hypotheses into the rule vaguely perceived level when they mentioned of the amounts of reward or punishment for some specific decks, and the reported amounts did not deviate from minimum or maximum predetermined amounts for the decks by more than 2,000 yen. As shown in table 1, amounts of reward and punishment for deck 3 and 4 were very close. To understand whether the participants vaguely acquired the governing rules for each deck, we decided 2000 yen was appropriate value as threshold. In addition, we classified reported hypotheses into the rule perceived level when they were correctly expressing the actual hidden rules about decks and suits color. According to the level of hypotheses, we divided all trials into three periods to examine the relationship between the level of comprehension of task rules and changes in autonomic responses.
SCRs data recording and analysis
During task execution, SCRs were continuously monitored and recorded on a computer through a physiological response processing unit (Polymate AP1542, TEAC). Disposable silver chloride electrodes were attached to the distal phalanges of the index and middle fingers of the participant's left hand to record SCRs. Since SCR is vulnerable to state anxiety, a period of at least 15 minutes was allowed prior to the start of the experiment for habituation to the experimental setting and measuring equipment. During this period, the participants settled down in a chair and were instructed how to perform the task.
In the present study, SCRs generated during the task were divided into three categories: anticipatory SCRs, pre-feedback SCRs, and post-feedback SCRs. We defined as anticipatory SCRs those that were generated prior to selecting cards in 5 sec., as prefeedback SCRs those that were generated within 5 sec. immediately after selecting cards, and as post-feedback SCRs those that were generated within 5 sec. immediately after receiving feedback. We regarded the lowest conductance value within the time windows as the baseline for each participant. With reference to the baseline, we calculated areas under the SCR curves generated within the time windows (Bechara et al., 1999) . We monitored the participants during the experiment and excluded SCRs that corresponded to pronounced motion from further analyses. In each trial, pre-feedback SCRs and postfeedback SCRs were divided into two categories according to a received feedback, i.e., reward or punishment. In trials with clubs or spades, we treated pre-feedback and postfeedback SCRs as pre-feedback reward SCRs and post-feedback reward SCRs. However, if the selected cards were hearts or diamonds, we treated these SCRs as pre-feedback punishment SCRs and post-feedback punishment SCRs.
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Although the participants could not report any rules correctly in the primary stage of the task (rule unperceived level), most of them began to notice that the amounts of rewards or punishments depended on suits color and decks after several trials (rule vaguely perceived level). According to verbal report from the participants, the initial 20 trials (2 sessions) were typically classified in the rule unperceived level, and the subsequent 30 trials (3 sessions) into the rule vaguely perceived level. The participants later became able to report approximately correct amounts of reward or punishment for each deck (rule perceived level). The last 50 trials were classified into this level. Combining the verbal report and deck selection, the number of required trials to understand the rule vaguely and precisely for each deck was calculated. The average numbers of trials across participants are shown in Fig. 2 .
There was only one participant who was unable to report any rules governing the task, and whose data were eliminated from further analysis. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the participants required approximately the same number of trials to grasp the rules for each deck. This tendency indicates that the participants tried to understand the rules for each deck evenly, regardless of the monetary advantage of each deck. The frequencies of choice of cards from decks 1, 2, 3, and 4 were 0.23, 0.23, 0.26, and 0.28, respectively. One sample t test revealed that these frequencies were not significantly different from 0.25 (deck 1: t(28) = -1.54, p = .13, deck 2: t(28) = -1.8, p = .08, deck 3: t(28) = 0.86, p = .40, deck 4: t(28) = 1.96, p = .06). These behavioral data ensured that the participants addressed themselves to the task according to instructions, and were not preoccupied by monetary reward or punishment.
Effects of monetary value on SCRs
The SCRs data for four participants could not be further analyzed due to loss of data by malfunctioning in SCR data recording. Repeated measures ANOVA did not reveal significant differences among decks with regard to anticipatory SCRs (F(3, 24) = 1.08, p = .36). Contrary to previous studies (e.g. Bechara et al., 1996) , neither expected monetary gains nor loss affected amplitudes of anticipatory SCRs in the present study. In addition, no difference was found by deck in the case of pre-feedback reward SCRs (F(3, 24) = 1.48, p = .23), pre-feedback punishment SCRs (F(3, 24) = 1.61, p = .20), postfeedback reward SCRs (F(3, 24) = 0.74, p = .53), or post-feedback punishment SCRs (F(3, 24) = 1.24, p = .30). These findings indicate that the amounts of external reward and punishment did not affect amplitudes of SCRs.
Effects of hypothesis-testing processes on SCRs
We examined how the comprehension of task rules affected participants' emotional responses by measuring several categories of SCRs. Since the analysis of variance revealed no significant difference among the five categories of SCRs for the decks, we used the mean amplitudes of SCRs across all decks for subsequent analyses. Since we defined the rule vaguely perceived level as a transitional period from the rule unperceived level to the rule perceived level, various degrees of the task rule comprehension were included in this level. We therefore performed further analyses using the data from the trials classified into the rule unperceived level and the rule perceived level alone. A 2 (level of comprehension of the task rules; unperceived and perceived) × 2 (feedback; reward and punishment) ANOVA of anticipatory SCRs revealed a main effect of level of comprehension of the task rules (F(1, 24) = 7.09, p < .05). A main effect of level of comprehension of the task rules was also found in a similar ANOVA on post-feedback SCRs (F(1, 24) = 5.36, p < .05). Importantly, the main effect of level of comprehension of task rules indicated that larger anticipatory SCRs and post-feedback SCRs were observed when the participants were at the rule unperceived level than at the rule perceived level. However, the main effect of level of comprehension of task rules was not significant in the ANOVA for pre-feedback SCRs (F(1, 24) = 0.27, p = .60). A significant main effect of feedback was identified by ANOVA for post-feedback SCR (F(1, 24) = 6.78, p < .05) (see Fig. 3 ). This main effect indicated that post-feedback SCRs were larger when the participants were punished than when they were rewarded.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we used a framework similar to the IGT in order to examine the relationship between autonomic responses and processes of hypothesis-testing. Our findings revealed that the amplitudes of anticipatory SCRs and post-feedback SCRs transition were associated with change in level of comprehension of the task rules, though the amplitude of pre-feedback SCRs remained invariant through the task. As we predicted, large anticipatory SCRs and post-feedback SCRs were observed when the participants only minimally understood the hidden task rules, but were attenuated when they completely understood such rules.
Our findings indicate that significant relationships exist between processes of hypothesis-testing and emotional responses. Because amplitudes of reward or punishment feedback SCRs were equivalent across all decks, the attenuations of anticipatory SCRs and post-feedback SCRs depended on the process of hypothesis-testing, rather than on the quantitative value of the reward or punishment associated with the task. Process of hypothesis-testing is considered to resolve uncertainty. Hypothesis-testing involves multicomponent processing, that consists hypothesis generation, monitoring differences between predicted and actual feedback according to the hypothesis, and finally, modifying The anticipatory SCRs and the post-feedback SCRs were attenuated after participants accurately identified the rules of the task. * Significantly different at p < .05.
the hypothesis (Tschirgi, 1980 ). At the rule unperceived level, expectation regarding feedback frequently differs from actual feedback, leading to emotional responses. Since possession of expectations and monitoring of errors are essential steps in modifying incorrect hypotheses, the emotional responses measured by autonomic responses could signal implicit understanding of the need for hypothesis modification. Since affirmation of tentative hypotheses was estimated as well as negation of those in processes of hypothesis-testing for participants at the rule unperceived level, prominent emotional responses were observed when their expectations accorded with actual outcomes. Therefore, attenuation of post-feedback SCRs was observed when the need to modify tentative hypotheses was diminished with acquisition of the correct rules. The same interpretation is applicable to the attenuation of anticipatory SCRs at the rule perceived level. In other words, emotions derived from processes of hypothesis-testing are congruent with motivation for problem-solving, and play critical roles in solving problems appropriately.
Many studies have investigated how autonomic reactivity are related to the execution of psychological tasks and associated with behavioral performance. Some have revealed that physiological emotional responses were provoked in association with the contextdependent value of certain events such as errors, as well as with superficial absolute values such as the amounts of reward or punishment (Crone et al., 2003; Crone, Somsen, van Beek, & van der Molen, 2004; Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005) . Consistent with our findings, these results suggest that emotional autonomic responses represent not only the physical value or valence of environmental feedback, but also its context-dependent evaluation, such as consequences of hypothesis-testing.
We could observe autonomic responses when the participants were expecting reward or punishment regardless of their amounts, because we uniquely attended to pre-feedback SCRs in addition to anticipatory and post-feedback SCRs. A previous study reported that SCRs generated during this period are appropriate indicators of internal state in anticipating reward (Amiez, Procyk, Honore, Sequeria, & Joseph, 2003) . However, prefeedback SCRs were unaffected by the participants' level of comprehension of the task rules or predictable valence of outcomes. Although the participants at rule perceived level were able to predict that they would receive reward or punishment as they selected a card and recognized its suit color, pre-feedback SCRs to clubs or spades and hearts or diamonds were identical. Consequently, pre-feedback SCRs did not reflect emotional responses to monetary reward or punishment, but anticipation of or preparation to accept outcomes. Since the sympathetic response to novelty and uncertainty is one of preparation for actions to deal with a potential threat (Thayer & Brosschot, 2005) , large-amplitude pre-feedback SCRs indicated a state of preparation for the appearance of the outcome itself. Since hypothesis-testing proceeds with time, it is essentially hard to distinguish the effect of motivation for hypothesis-testing on SCR from habituation to the task. Our results showing that pre-feedback SCRs remained large level to the end of the experiment, and it may support the notion that attenuations of anticipatory and feedback SCRs reflect reduction of the motivation, not habituation for the task situation.
In addition to our main results, we also found that the amplitude of post-feedback SCRs was affected by the valence of feedback. Though we did not observe differences among the four decks, post-feedback SCRs to punishment clearly exceeded those to reward in all deck. This finding indicates that punishment causes much more salient responses than reward, even though the punishment and reward in this experiment are merely symbolic. For evolutionary reasons, humans adapt their behavior effectively to avoid primary and secondary punishment (Delgado, Labouliere, & Phelps, 2006) , and certain brain regions, such as the lateral OFC, are considered neural substrates for punishment processing (Le Doux, 1996; O'Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001) . From studies on this line, the salient response to the punishment would be inevitable inclination even though the punishment is symbolic, but we could inhibit the inclination on some level in the context of present study by the instruction. The IGT was originally developed to experimentally assess the cognitive impairments of OFC-damaged patients (Bechara et al., 1994) , the obtained results with it suggest that the mechanism of emotion, which involves the OFC, subserves appropriate decision-making , Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000a . In addition, some suggested functions of the OFC are 1) processing and evaluation of physical reward and punishment (Elliott, Frith, & Dolan, 1997; Thut et al., 1997; O'Doherty et al., 2001; O'Doherty, Critchley, Deichmann, & Dolan, 2003) ; 2) detection of error in the expectation of reward (Rolls, 2000; Ramnani et al., 2004) ; 3) monitoring of consistency between expected reward and actual outcome (Elliott, Ress, & Dolan, 1999) , and 4) reversal learning (Clark, Cools, & Robbins, 2004; Fellows & Farah, 2003 , 2005 . Recent functional neuroimaging studies have indicated that activation of the OFC is observed when participants anticipate or monitor outcomes following their predictions, independent of receiving tangible rewards (Schnider, Treyer, & Buck, 2005; Ramnani et al., 2004) . These findings suggest that the OFC plays critical roles in expectations regarding and monitoring of the outcomes of self own behavior (Elliott et al., 1999) . The results of previous studies and of the present one in turn suggest that the OFC damage could impair process of hypothesis-testing, and thereby result in abnormal autonomic responses to context.
In the present study, using psychophysiological methods, we obtained findings suggesting that "rational" cognitive processing such as decision-making is supported by affective components related to the hypothesis-testing itself. In addition, we found that cognitive evaluations of reward and punishment are not determined by absolute physical value, but are variably affected by subjective evaluation of outcomes corresponding to situation and context. Our findings thus suggest that emotional autonomic reactivity which proceeds with hypothesis-testing process supports cognitive processes such as problem solving by indicating the consequences of ongoing process.
